autonomy presumes that you can take part in decisions that affect you.
What the team does with Sanctum itself is not up to the community or futarchy.
they did ask us about making the app WONDER…
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I think this might interest you: [Proposal] Dynamic Autonomous Matrix (DAM) for the Sanctum DAO
Curious to get your thoughts on it. 
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thanks for sharing! This indeed sounds very interesting, but I fear it would give too much agency to the AI, and focusses less on providing structured deliberation among the affected. But that is adjustable I assume. All in all, it could be some kind of “trias politica”, legislative, juridicial and executive. It could be an interesting balanced alternative to futarchy. I think it would be interesting to combine it with a deliberation layer. I think the part about responsibilities of the different branches would need some more details.
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Great feedback! And I agree, I was thinking the same after reading your initial post here.
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Because they would have used funding from the community reserve. The community reserve is where most of the CLOUD tokens are locked, so yea I guess in a way deciding how it’s used effects CLOUD holders the most.
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so refreshing to read something that is not obviously chatgpt 
(nothing against chatgpt. I say this in the kindest ways, as someone who uses LLMs to check their japanese writing all day long at work)
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thanks <3 I do use chatgpt (mostly to help me structure), but I always make sure it stays within my tone and I still write most myself.
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It’s quite alright.
I think many of us have AI assistants that helps us sound more grammatical and structured. Using them should help with understanding and progress in our discussions and debates.
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Instead of just deliberation, why not a full Sanctum Governance Layer: Proposal: Sanctum Governance Layer (SGL)
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I love the fallacy of this election prediction markets idea.
They don’t work as well as everyone makes out. People have been able to bet on elections for decades and the results are as predictive as election polling.
People pushing this narrative that polls are inaccurate compared to prediction markets always ignore the polls that were right and the prediction markets that were wrong. Cause there are a lot of both.
Of course one election poll is 100% accurate all the time: The actual election vote.
Which is a poll. Like any other.
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As someone who has actively traded on futarchy markets and considers myself well-versed in the concept, I want to share my perspective.
Ultimately, the concept itself has both positive and negative aspects. But using futarchy exclusively as a signal makes no sense, since the whole point is that you are literally putting your money on the outcome of a given event. If futarchy is reduced to nothing more than a signaling mechanism, without proposals being binding and executed according to the outcome, then trading loses its entire rationale. In that case, it makes far more sense to use the standard mechanism of stakeholder voting, counting staked CLOUD or the staking score.
Futarchy as an idea is a very interesting concept. And perhaps, with proper implementation—where most participants understand how to use the mechanism of trading proposals; when there is good market liquidity and adequate spreads —it could serve as an excellent tool for a DAO. After all, voting here means taking real financial risk. But this model works best in a full DAO, where market participants are essentially all stakeholders of the project (team, community, investors, etc.).
To be completely honest, I don’t think this model is suitable for Sanctum. Using only parts of the mechanism and reducing it to a signal for the team creates nothing more than a temporary spike in community attention rather than a sustainable governance process.
The true value of futarchy comes when decisions are binding and strictly executed. In practice, however, only a small portion of participants actually use the mechanism in full, market liquidity is insufficient for large volumes, and outcomes can therefore be influenced with relatively small amounts of capital. On top of that, proposals are censored by the team before they even reach the voting stage.
At the end of the day, what goes to a vote depends entirely on the team, not the community. And it should not be forgotten that all real progress ultimately comes from the team — not from the community that votes. That is why I don’t see futarchy as a suitable model here.
Personally, I believe futarchy is an interesting concept, but it is not applicable to Sanctum model. It was a great experiment, but using it solely as a signal is a waste of time and resources, because the concept loses all of its actual value.
The more I observe, the more I come to the conclusion that DAO is a myth in general. We should admit we are not a DAO. Funtarchy does not bring DAO - it brings temporary spike of community activity during discussions and voting, and some spot trading volumes through arbitrage or from participants who don’t stake Cloud.
DAO as a concept in general simply doesn’t work. We can talk a lot about proposals, but in the end the balance of motivation is completely broken. First, it is highly unlikely that we, as ordinary market participants, can create a solid proposal that generates additional value. Second, proposals are subject to censorship by the team. Third, the process requires an enormous amount of time, and even if someone is able to come up with a meaningful idea, they often lack motivation—unless they are a large sCLOUD holder. So a person capable of making a good proposal that the team might disagree with simply has no chance at all.
This creates a conflict: a large sCLOUD holder may have strong incentives, but in practice has no influence due to the censorship of proposals. As a result, there’s no motivation to create good proposals, and the balance of power stays with the team.
DAO in this form carries no value. The only real value comes from communty in ideas generation.
I see the current model like this:
community idea generation → team censorship → deliberation → voting → execution.
This is clearly not a DAO. We should accept the reality of the current model.
Also I really like the idea of adding the stage of “Post-mortem & learning” as it’s really interesting to admit mistakes, correct them and improve. But how will it look? Who will be responsible for it? Should we rely on community feedback or should there be someone from the team responsible for that?
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so lets cut out team censorship with decentralized deliberation decision layers
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The only on chain governance that truly works (currently) is token emission voting (see: Velodrome, Balancer, Curve etc..).
It’s not without it’s issues, but it’s literally: Vote for a thing > That thing happens on chain
You make a great point about vote > action. There is no link in the Futarchy model. For all the crap they (Futarchy) throw at DAO models like Arbitrum, Jupiter, Optimism, Lido, ApeDAO etc… those DAOs are functioning organisations who are doing things in governance whereas Futarchy aren’t doing anything. They seem to have pivoted to a launchpad now, which is so far from governance it’s not funny any more.
I say move CLOUD to a simplified governance model with a couple of direct vote to action aspects
- Vote for LSTs: I don’t know how this would work but some sort of fee allocation, via a regular CLOUD vote, would drive engagement with CLOUD and eyeballs on LSTs (of which there is now a very long list of). Adding in some sort of bribe mechanism would be positive as token projects (e.g., BONK) could bribe in their own token. Don’t need to reinvent the wheel, just copy what works in EVM land now.
- Vote to break time lock: This is potentially a lot more interesting. Institute a time based lock for voting power but give a way to end that lock via a CLOUD vote. That is, token holders can hold the team to account via a successful lock break vote which would unlock all holder tokens immediately. It’s akin to a no confidence vote from share holders in a traditional company.
You can still, and should have, regular votes which are not directly enforceable. After all, voting is a great community engagement and growth mechanic.
But these couple of directly enforceable aspects, IMO, would underpin the legitimacy of the governance aspect.