Ideas for the Passive / Active Rewards (ASR) Model
Objective
The idea behind the Passive / Active Rewards (ASR) model is to maintain active participation of stakers in decision-making related to ASR while introducing a passive rewards component.
Key goals:
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Make reward distribution more flexible: even participants who miss some votes should still be eligible for a share of rewards.
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Reduce operational load on the team by introducing two formalized standard proposals, allowing the team to focus only on meaningful non-standard proposals if these occur with ASR season.
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Formalize the ASR process, making it transparent, predictable, and easier to manage.
ASR season duration
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Instead of splitting the ASR period into two 3-month quarters, it is proposed to move to 6-month cycles to reduce the workload for the team.
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A single ASR season lasts 6 months.
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Reward distribution for each period takes place in the month following the end of the 6-month cycle.
Reward Eligibility Conditions
If it is technically possible to distribute the passive portion of rewards without requiring mandatory participation in voting, the mechanism of standard voting (proposed and explained below) can be completely removed.
However, if participation in voting remains a mandatory requirement for receiving even passive rewards, a more sophisticated Passive / Active reward model should be considered.
Proposed Reward Pool Structure
The total reward pool for each ASR period is divided into two categories:
*(The figures below are illustrative — exact amounts will be determined if/once the ASR mechanism is finalized.)
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Passive Share (Minimum Guaranteed Rewards)
=> A pre-agreed amount with a flexible or capped parameter based on effective APR, to avoid excessive reward allocation risks (as seen in the first ASR season).
*(Specific limitations and mechanisms should be discussed and defined if/once the ASR model is finalized).
=> Example amount: 8M for a 6-month period.
=> Available to all participants who vote at least once during the period — either in a standard or an additional proposal.
=> Reward calculation formula:
Participant’s reward = ( Participant’s staking ASR season score / Total staking score of all participants) × Passive reward pool
This means that participating in at least one vote within the 6-month period is enough to qualify for the minimum passive reward.
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Active Share (Additional Bonus)
=> Distributed only if there are additional proposals during the period, beyond the two standard ones.
=> Calculated using the ASR formula weighted with non-standard votes:
Participant’s reward = (SASR_w_n_s_v) / (SUM of ALL participants SASR_w_n_s_v) × Active reward pool,
where
“SASR_w_n_s_v” - staking ASR season score weighted with the number of active non-standard votes. In other words = Staking ASR season score × by the number of active votes.
=> Example amount: 4M for a 6-month period.
=> If there are no additional proposals, the active bonus is not distributed.
Two Standard Mandatory Votes
To ensure participants have the opportunity to receive the passive share of rewards, it is proposed to introduce two fixed voting checkpoints within each ASR period.
This provides participants with at least two opportunities to cast a vote — at the start and at the end of each period.
Vote #1 — End of Current Period (~last 2 weeks of the ASR season)
Purpose: decide whether to continue ASR.
This vote gives the community direct control over the future of the ASR program and allows discontinuation if it’s no longer needed.
Vote #2 — Start of New Period (~first 2 weeks of the ASR season)
Purpose: determine the reward pool size for the next 6-month period.
Participants vote on the rewards allocations: the passive and active allocations.
This means that:
• At the end of the current ASR season, participants vote on whether to continue the ASR program.
• If the decision is positive, then at the start of the next ASR season, participants vote to approve the reward pool size.
This system of standard votes ensures that participants always have two guaranteed voting opportunities per period, allowing them to secure their eligibility for passive rewards, even if no additional proposals are introduced during the season. Moreover, having clear and predefined timeframes for these proposals helps minimize the risk of missing ASR rewards. Additionally, having two standardized and formalized proposals per season should reduce the team’s workload, as these proposals are predetermined, structured, and require minimal additional effort.
Ideally, it would be best to avoid introducing two standard proposals altogether if the passive rewards can be fully integrated and distributed without requiring participants to take part in any voting.
Potential Risks
Formalizing the process through standard votes introduces new risks:
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Potential conflicts between the team’s position and the community’s decision regarding ASR continuation or reward pool sizing.
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If the community votes to extend ASR but the team disagrees, this may create a confusing situation.
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A potential solution is to introduce a team veto mechanism on voting results of standard ASR proposals to prevent critical conflicts, as well as to pre-agree on the amount allocated for ASR before submitting proposals for voting.
Summary
- Reward distribution under ASR occurs once every 6 months instead of quarterly.
- The Passive / Active model is introduced:
- Two standard proposals per ASR period with clear and predefined timeframes:
=> End of period → decision to continue or terminate ASR;
=> Start of new period → approval of the reward pool size.
- If the mechanism of two standard proposals is adopted, it is critical to define conflict mitigation safeguards:
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Currently, no proposal is brought to a vote without team approval.
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However, with mandatory standard proposals, refusing to submit them would effectively block passive ASR rewards.
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Misalignment between the team and community regarding ASR parameters may increase governance risks.
PS: I’m not a fan of introducing unnecessary complexity into the ASR model and believe it would be best to avoid implementing two standard proposals altogether if passive rewards can be fully integrated and distributed without requiring participants to vote. That said, I understand that the mechanism proposed above may feel like an overcomplication, but if this approach helps preserve the ASR model, reduce the team’s workload, and provide meaningful rewards to participants even who miss futarchy votes — then it’s an idea worth considering.
Yes → A new period starts.
No → The ASR program ends.
Not obvious enough for me to see before my comment 
